Jagged sphere - The Interpreter

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Jagged sphere - The Interpreter

Jagged sphere - The Interpreter

Posted: 23 Jun 2021 06:38 AM PDT

Banner image: Workers lay tracks at the construction site of the China-Laos railway in Vientiane, Laos, 27 March 2020. The rail is the longest in Asia outside China (Kaikeo Saiyasane/Xinhua via Getty).

The author acknowledges the funding provided by the Australian Department of Defence through its Strategic Policy Grants program of 2019-20 which facilitated the author's original research for this paper.

Photographs by Greg Raymond and Anna Judith were taken on a research trip to Laos and Myanmar in 2019.

[1] "Transport Infrastructure in China — Statistics & Facts", Statista, https://www.statista.com/topics/1516/transport-infrastructure-in-china/#dossierSummary__chapter2, accessed 21 April 2021.

[2] Bruno Macaes, The Dawn of Eurasia: On the Trail of the New World Order, (London: Penguin Books, 2018).

[3] Glenn Diesen, The Decay of Western Civilisation and the Resurgence of Russia: Between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. (London: Routledge, 2019), 101.

[4] Also known as the CLMVT states, an acronym comprising the first letter of each of the five states. This paper will use the terms 'mainland Southeast Asia', 'Mekong region', and 'CLMVT' interchangeably.

[5] The recently concluded Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP, signed 15 November 2020) is likely to increase these trade and investment flows.

[6] Evelyn Goh, "The Asia Pacific's 'Age of Uncertainty' Great Power Competition, Globalisation, and the Economic-Security Nexus", RSIS Working Paper No 330, S Rajaratnam School of International Studies Singapore, 10 June 2020.

[9] Connectivity is also developing through electricity networks and satellite ground station networks, but these are beyond the scope of this paper.

[10] In 2018, eminent Australian strategist Paul Dibb warned of Southeast Asia becoming a Chinese sphere of influence. Paul Dibb, "New Security Reality Demands New Australian Policy", ASPI Strategist, 23 July 2018, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/new-security-reality-demands-new-australian-policy/. In 2019, former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans suggested that China was recreating "some kind of hegemonic, tributary relationship with its southern neighbours" in which Cambodia and Laos become "wholly owned subsidiaries of Beijing". "Leadership in 2019 — An Address by Gareth Evans AC, QC", Asialink, 22 February 2019, https://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/stories/leadership-in-2019-an-address-by-gareth-evans-ac,-qc.

[11] In 2019, veteran commentator and former Singaporean diplomat Bilahari Kausikan stated that "China's natural gravitational pull is being enhanced by various infrastructure projects. These projects have geopolitical consequences, intended or not. They could in effect merge southwest China and mainland Southeast Asia into one economic space. International boundaries will of course remain as lines on maps. But they could be relegated to inconveniences or irrelevancies." in Hoang Thi Ha, "Understanding China's Proposal for an ASEAN–China Community of Common Destiny and ASEAN's Ambivalent Response", Contemporary Southeast Asia, 41, 2 (2019), 231. In 2020, Kausikan stated, in reference to Laos and Cambodia, that "We may have to cut loose the two to save the eight", in "Bilahari Kausikan: Asean May Have to Cut Members if they Continue to be Led by an External Power", 35th ASEAN Roundtable, 24 October 2020, https://mothership.sg/2020/10/bilahari-asean-china/.

[12] The term emerged during late colonialism. The Russian foreign minister told his British counterpart that Afghanistan was outside the Russian sphere of influence. Meanwhile, powers such as France, Germany, and Britain agreed to give the other a 'free hand' in administering their respective claims in Africa. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 207–215.

[14] For example, in one year of its secret war between 1963 and 1974, the United States dropped more ordnance on Laos than it did on Japan for the whole of the Second World War. Joshua Kurlantzick, A Great Place to Have a War: America in Laos and the Birth of a Military CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2016), 177.

[18] Laos and Myanmar have faced additional challenges. The Laos economy has been primarily based on subsistence agriculture and, historically, its geography meant it was not a trading or manufacturing state.

[19] Martin Stuart‐Fox, "Laos in Asean: Dilemmas of Development and Identity", Asian Studies Review, 22:2, 223–237, 231; and Simon Creak, "LAOS: Celebrations and Development Debates", Southeast Asian Affairs, 2011, 107–128, 109.

[21] Kimly Ngoun, "Adaptive Authoritarian Resilience: Cambodian Strongman's Quest for Legitimacy", Journal of Contemporary Asia, November 2020, 11.

[22] Some scepticism about ASEAN's real commitment to economic integration is warranted, given levels of intra-regional trade have remained stagnant for decades at or below 25 per cent of total trade, despite the introduction of an ASEAN Economic Community in 2015. See Jayant Menon, "Regional Means and Global Objectives", East Asia Forum Quarterly, January–March 2018, 7, https://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n4206/pdf/book.pdf.

[25] Emily T Yeh and Elizabeth Wharton, "Going West and Going Out: Discourses, Migrants, and Models in Chinese Development, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 57:3, 2016, 286–315.

[27] Markus Brunnermeier, Rush Doshi, and Harold James, "Beijing's Bismarckian Ghosts: How Great Powers Compete Economically", The Washington Quarterly, 41:3, 2018, 161–176, 170.

[28] Chris Rahman, "Singapore: Forward Operating Site", in Carnes Lord and Andrew S Erickson (eds), Rebalancing US Forces: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific, (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2014), 121–122.

[29] Joey Long, "Strategic Partners: Singapore and the United States", in Andrew T H Tan (ed), Handbook on the United States in Asia: Managing Hegemonic Decline, Retaining Influence in the Trump Era (Cheltenham, Glos: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018), 275.

[31] Dorsch and Cui estimate that 82 per cent of China's oil imports, 72 per cent of its coal imports and 30 per cent of its sea-transported natural gas pass through the Strait of Malacca. Jörn Dosch and Shannon Cui, "China's 21st Century Maritime Silk Road" in Donald Emmerson (ed) The Deer and the Dragon: Southeast Asia and China in the 21st Century, (Stanford, CA: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center), 338.

[32] For example, the People's Liberation Air Force (PLAF) would be able to launch an aircraft from a Cambodian base and land and refuel on an artificial island in the South China Sea, and vice versa, in between undertaking combat and surveillance tasks. Drake Long, "Cambodia, China and the Dara Sakor Problem", The Diplomat, 21 October 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/cambodia-china-and-the-dara-sakor-problem/.

[35] China has been Cambodia's largest foreign investor since 1995, providing somewhere between a quarter and a third of its total foreign investment. Daniel O'Neill, "Playing Risk: Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Cambodia", Contemporary Southeast Asia, 36:2, August 2014, 173–205, 179 cites one-third; and Mark Grimsditch, "The Cambodia Conundrum: The Belt and Road, Private Capital and China's 'Non-Interference' Policy", Panda Paw Dragon Claw, 25 June 2019, https://pandapawdragonclaw.blog/2019/06/25/the-cambodia-conundrum-the-belt-and-road-private-capital-and-chinas-non-interference-policy/ cites 23 per cent for the 2000–2017 period.

[41] It could be argued that trade, investment, and infrastructure are not separable because foreign investment can drive transport infrastructure development. But high levels of trade with China are often not accompanied by Chinese infrastructure investment (for example, Australia and Thailand), and vice versa (for example, Cambodia has more investment than trade).

[42] Brian Eyler, The Last Days of the Mighty Mekong, (London: Zed Books, 2019), 8.

[43] Vietnam withdrew its forces from Cambodia in 1989 and began its 'opening up' [doi moi] policy. Thailand commenced its efforts to turn 'battlefields into marketplaces'.

[44] Siriluk Masviriyakul, "Sino-Thai Strategic Economic Development in the Greater Mekong Subregion (1992–2003)", Contemporary Southeast Asia, 26:2, August 2004, 306. The region adjacent to Yunnan, Guangxi, also joined the GMS in 2005.

[45] David Martin Jones, "ASEAN's Imitation Economic Community", in Bruno Jetin and Mia Mikic (eds), ASEAN Economic Community: A Model for Asia-wide Regional Integration (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016), 18.

[48] The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road aims to join China to Europe via the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, while the Silk Road Economic Belt aims to link together China, Russia, Central Asia, and Europe.

[49] Min Ye, "Fragmentation and Mobilization: Domestic Politics of the Belt and Road in China", Journal of Contemporary China, 28:119, 696–711. In 2017, the policy was renamed the Belt and Road Initiative, but the Chinese-language term remained the same. Ankit Panda, "How Old Is China's Belt and Road Initiative Exactly?", The Diplomat, 11 February 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/how-old-is-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-exactly/; and Ryan Manuel, "Twists in the Belt and Road", Chinese Leadership Monitor, 1 September 2019, https://www.prcleader.org/manuel-belt-road..

[50] Yiping Huang, "Understanding China's Belt & Road Initiative: Motivation, Framework and Assessment", China Economic Review 40, September 2016, 314–321.

[55] Economic corridors are "geographically defined areas" facilitating "the national and transnational movement of people, goods, services, capital, and information". In 1998, the GMS nominated three economic corridors: a North–South Economic Corridor (NSEC), an East–West Economic Corridor (EWEC), and a Southern Economic Corridor: "Assessment of Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Corridors: People's Republic of China", 10th Economic Corridors Forum, 13 December 2018, (Manila: GMS Secretariat, Asian Development Bank), 1, https://www.greatermekong.org/sites/default/files/Assessment%20of%20GMS%20Economic%20Corridors_PRC_web.pdf.

[59] Despite COVID-19, the project remains on track to be complete by December 2021. Xie Jun and Ma Jingjing, "BRI Contributes Global Post-pandemic Recovery by Laying Foundation for Cooperation and Stabilizing Global Supply Chains", Global Times, 25 January 2021, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202101/1213878.shtml.

[60] Pongphisoot Busbarat, "China's 'Shame Offensive': The Omission of Thailand's Prime Minister from the Belt and Road Initiative Summit 2017", Perspective, ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, 19 July 2017, 4.

[66] Acker, "The Geography of Political Fragmentation", 144.

[68] "รมค้านระเบดแก่งเปิดเดินเรือน้ำโขง" [Opposition to Blasting Rapids to Open Passage of Ships in Mekong], Post Today, 6 March 2018, B12.

[70] See eg Tuong Vu, "In the Service of World Revolutions: Vietnamese Communists' Radical Ambitions through the Three Indochina Wars", Journal of Cold War Studies, 21:4, Fall 2019, 4–30, 28.and "Thailand Seeks to Shape a 'Golden Peninsula'", New York Times, 30 April 1989, 19.

[71] For this purpose, it loaned Laos US$28.5 million for the construction of 85 kilometres of the 228-kilometre road between Huay Xai on the Mekong and Boten on the China–Laos border. Pasuwat Yathip, "Thailand's Foreign Policy in the post-Cold War Period: Uncovering New Actors in the Foreign Policy-making Process towards Neighbouring Countries", PhD thesis, James Cook University, 2015, 208.

[72] In 1990, the combined GDPs of China's Guangxi and Yunnan provinces were about a fifth the size of Thailand's economyBy 2017, their combined GDP was roughly equal to Thailand's. In 1990, Guangxi and Yunnan were together smaller than the Vietnamese economy. In 2017, they were almost double. Source: Great Mekong Subregion Statistical Database, https://www.greatermekong.org/stats/index-static.php.

[73] "คำสัมภาษณ์ นายอนุสนธ์ ชินวรรโณ อธบดีกรมเอเชียตะวันออก กระทรวงการต่างประเทศ" [Interview with Mr Anusorn Chinvanno, Head of East Asia Ministry of Foreign Affairs in LTGEN Sirichai Distagul], ผลกระทบจากถ่วงดุลทางยุทธศาสตร์ระหว่างจีนกับสหรับฯทีมีประเทศไทยในห้วงปี ๒๕๕๐ข๒๕๕๔ [Effect of China–US Strategic Balance of Power on Thailand during 2007–2011], unpublished thesis, National Defence College, 2007, 123.

[74] Gregory V Raymond and John C Blaxland, The US–Thai Alliance and Asian International Relations: History, Memory and Current Developments, (Routledge), forthcoming.

[78] "Geographical location also provides Bangkok a unique advantage in its negotiations with Beijing. As the projected SKRL cannot bypass Thailand, Bangkok holds a strategic veto." Shang-Su Wu and Alan Chong, "Developmental Railpolitics: The Political Economy of China's High-Speed Rail Projects in Thailand and Indonesia", Contemporary Southeast Asia, 40:3, December 2018, 503–526, 514.

[80] Suvarnabhumi, Don Mueang and Utapao airports.

[85] A 2009 WikiLeaks cable from the US Embassy in Japan stated, "Japan's outreach to Mekong countries, and to Southeast Asia in general, is aimed in part to counter what the Japanese perceive as China's growing presence in the region" and that "Embassy contacts expressed concern about the prospect for these countries to fall within China's 'orb of influence'.", in "Japan Advancing Ties to the Mekong Region", 09TOKYO2567, 6 November 2009, https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09TOKYO2567_a.html.

[86] Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, "The Mekong Region, Regional Integration, and Political Rivalry among ASEAN, China and Japan", Asian Perspective, 2010, 34:3 (2010), 71–111, 97.

[87] There were 1575 Japanese-affiliated companies in Thailand in 2006, the most numerous in Thailand. Masami Ishida, "Evaluating the Effectiveness of GMS Economic Corridors: Why is There More Focus on the Bangkok–Hanoi Road than the East-West Corridor?", Institute of Developing Economies, Discussion Paper No 123, October 2007, 3, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/288456865.pdf.

[91] Pradumna B Rana, "Need for Reset: Modi's Cross-Border Connectivity Policy", RSIS Commentary, No 177, 8 October 2020.

[96] In Hoang Thi Ha, "Understanding China's Proposal for an ASEAN–China Community of Common Destiny and ASEAN's Ambivalent Response", Contemporary Southeast Asia, 41, 2 (2019), 231.

[104] "ทุนจีนสร้างเมืองใหม่ ชายแดนไทย แม่สอด-เมียวดี" [Chinese Investment Builds a New City on the Thai Border at Mae Sot–Myawaddy], Thai PBS News, 22 January 2020, https://bit.ly/3mG5wpP.

[108] Kearrin Sims, "High Modernism in a Small Country: China 'Develops' Laos", in Donald K Emmerson, The Deer and the Dragon, (Stanford, CA: Walter H Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center), 271.

[109] Kearrin Sims, "Gambling on the Future: Casino Enclaves, Development, and Poverty Alleviation in Laos", Pacific Affairs, 90:4, December 2017, 675–700, 681.

[112] Sebastian Strangio, In the Dragon's Shadow: Southeast Asia in the Chinese Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020), 53.

[114] Kearrin Sims, "Gambling on the Future".

[115] Pal Nyiri, "Enclaves of Improvement: Sovereignty and Developmentalism in the Special Zones of the China-Lao Borderlands", Comparative Studies in Society and History, 54:3, July 2012, 536-537.

[116] Victoria Reyes, Global Borderlands: Fantasy, Violence, and Empire in Subic Bay, Philippines, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2019), 2.

[122] Under the agreement, Laos would finance its share of the initial construction cost, US$2.4 billion, through $250 million from its own budget and a $470 million loan from Export Import Bank of China at 2.3 per cent interest. This leaves Laos owing US$1.1 billion for its share of the longer-term cost. Peter Janssen, "China Train Project Runs Roughshod over Laos", Asia Times, 18 August 2018, https://asiatimes.com/2018/08/china-train-project-runs-roughshod-over-laos/.

[123] World Bank, "From Landlocked to Land-Linked: Unlocking the Potential of Laos-China Rail Connectivity" (Washington DC: World Bank 2020), 20.

[124] Beijing Insurance Research Foundation, "Country Risk Data Analysis: Laos Investment Risk Research", June 2019, 27, http://www.bjircf.org/show.php?catid=9&id=112&fbclid=IwAR20WJTF44e_fmNpggOFY5VLb9Ffq_DxtRpcyZH_3wsTct2-pET9qPPngDs; and World Bank, "From Landlocked to Land-Linked: Unlocking the Potential of Lao–China Rail Connectivity", World Bank, Washington, 2020, 47, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/33891.

[127] Pinkaew Laungaramsri, "Commodifying Sovereignty: Special Economic Zone and the Neoliberalization of the Lao Frontier", The Journal of Lao Studies, 3:1, 29–56, 36.

[128] Kearrin Sims, "High Modernism", 278.

[130] Yos Santasombat (ed), Impact of China's Rise on the Mekong Region, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), 10.

[131] Northern Laos Industrial Economic Development and Cooperation Planning Preparation Group, 2008, 15, in Pinkaew Laungaramsri, "Commodifying Sovereignty: Special Economic Zone and the Neoliberalization of the Lao Frontier", The Journal of Lao Studies, 3:1, 29–56, 40.

[133] Yue Man Yeung, Joanna Lee, and Gordon Kee, "China's Special Economic Zones", Eurasian Geography and Economics, March 2009, 50:2, 222–240, 234.

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